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ABSTRACT
Blockchain scalability is one of the issues that concerns its current adopters. The
current popular blockchains have initially been designed with imperfections that in-
troduce fundamental bottlenecks which limit their ability to have a higher throughput
and a lower latency.
One of the major bottlenecks for existing blockchain technologies is fast block
propagation. A faster block propagation enables a miner to reach a majority of the
network within a time constraint and therefore leading to a lower orphan rate and
better profitability. In order to attain a throughput that could compete with the
current state of the art transaction processing, while also keeping the block intervals
same as today, a 24.3 Gigabyte block will be required every 10 minutes with an
average transaction size of 500 bytes, which translates to 48600000 transactions every
10 minutes or about 81000 transactions per second.
In order to synchronize such large blocks faster across the network while maintain-
ing consensus by keeping the orphan rate below 50%, the thesis proposes to aggregate
partial block data from multiple nodes using digital fountain codes. The advantages
of using a fountain code is that all connected peers can send part of data in an encoded
form. When the receiving peer has enough data, it then decodes the information to
reconstruct the block. Along with them sending only part information, the data can
be relayed over UDP, instead of TCP, improving upon the speed of propagation in
the current blockchains. Fountain codes applied in this research are Raptor codes,
which allow construction of infinite decoding symbols. The research, when applied to
blockchains, increases success rate of block delivery on decode failures.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
A blockchain, is a continuously growing list of records, called blocks, which are
linked and secured using cryptography. Each block typically contains a crypto-
graphic hash of the previous block, a time stamp and transaction data. By design, a
blockchain is immutable because of the linked structure. It is ”an open, distributed
ledger that can record transactions between two parties efficiently and in a verifiable
and permanent way” according to [25]. In order to be used as distributed ledger, it
is managed by a peer to peer network, in which all peers/nodes follow one protocol.
This protocol takes care of messaging between these peers, and adding and validating
the new blocks formed. Once a block is added to the blockchain, the block can’t be
altered, since all blocks added after will need to be changed.
Blockchains are secure by design and exemplify a distributed computing system
with high Byzantine fault tolerance, leading to consensus in a decentralized network.
This makes blockchains potentially suitable for the recording of events, medi-
cal records, and other records management activities, such as identity management,
transaction processing, documenting provenance, food traceability, and voting. [7]
Blockchain was invented by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 to serve as the public trans-
action ledger of the cryptocurrency bitcoin [30]. The invention of the blockchain for
bitcoin made it the first digital currency to solve the double-spending problem with-
out the need of trust. Blockchain networks essentially engage two major types of
actors:
1. Miners: Mining is the process of adding transaction records to the public
ledger. The miners, in a proof of work blockchain, solve a computationally diffi-
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cult problem in order to add a block to the ledger. In bitcoin, this problem is to
solve for a number (nonce) [10] that when hashed with the block data must start
with a certain number of zeroes. This number of zeroes is termed the difficulty of
the network. The miner who successfully adds a block to the ledger is rewarded
with a block reward along with the fee on all transactions included in the block.
The miners, therefore have incentive in computing the hash for the next block
and propagating it to the network so that their block is accepted. In order to
mine these computationally expensive hashes and propagate them through the
network, miners invest heavily into high grade infrastructure, bandwidth for the
node and the electricity costs of running the mentioned hardware.
2. Propagation Nodes: These nodes are voluntary nodes on the network that
help in propagation of the blocks and transactions. Propagation nodes are of 2
types:
(a) Full Nodes: These nodes help in propagating the complete blocks and
fulfill all requests. In addition to propagating the blocks, it also verifies
and validates the transactions by checking its inputs and outputs. They
validate whether there is a double spend on the transaction by checking a
complete history of the transaction. They also verify the signatures of the
witnesses. In order to validate and serve all requests, these blocks store
the complete copy of the blockchain.
(b) Light Nodes/SPV (Simplified Payment Verification): These nodes
are lightweight nodes that run on machines with less computational power
and less storage. They also validate the block but not by checking the
transactions in depth, but they do so by checking their merkle proofs.
That is basically hashing all the transaction hashes together to see if the
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merkle root [8] present in the block header is what they get after hashing all
their transactions. In order to do so, the SPV wallets only need the header
of all blocks included in the chain and the merkle proofs. Therefore, these
nodes do not store a copy of the blockchain and hence don’t propagate
complete blocks. These are often run on Raspberry Pis or mobile wallets.
The Dash network [21] employs an additional 2nd layer protocol, commonly re-
ferred to as the Masternode layer.
1. Masternode: These nodes are full nodes which aim to help the Dash blockchain
network by providing services and, in return, get awarded by sharing a portion
of the block reward with miners. The requirements for a full node to be a
masternode are as follows:
(a) The node at all times should have a 1000 dash in its wallet.
(b) The node should run a high bandwidth connection. The current require-
ment is 1 Gigabit per second.
(c) The node should run significant memory (RAM), in order to store the
transaction set in memory for faster validation. It is currently 4GB but
might increase based on future needs.
In order for the blockchain network to run securely and all the consensus rules be
enforced, it is important that the network contains a significant number of full nodes
and help verifying transactions and propagating complete block data. The current
bitcoin network runs 10,000 nodes approximately.
As the blockchain decentralized network grows larger or the number of transactions
on the network, the network runs into issues relating to scalability that are explained
below.
3
1.1 Scalability Challenges with blockchains
1.1.1 Challenge: Throughput
The block interval [3] in a blockchain network is controlled by the mining difficulty
[9], which approximates to 2 minutes 30 seconds in Dash network, and lives in the
neighbourhood of 10 minutes in the bitcoin network. In the bitcoin network, the
mining difficulty is adjusted every 2016 blocks in order to get it closer to the above
mentioned intervals. The block size was initially not constrained. However, it was
later capped to 1MB in 2010 [6]. The average size of transaction on the bitcoin
network is 500 bytes. The maximum number of transactions that can be packed inside
a block is dependent on the transaction sizes for that block, however approximating
500 bytes a transaction, the throughput is close to 3.5 transactions per second. In the
bitcoin blockchain network, it is seen that with a mixed transaction size, the network
roughly has a throughput of 3-7 transactions per second [40].
Transaction sizes depend on three variables :
1. List of inputs
2. List of outputs
3. A list of witnesses, that is one per each input and is dependent on a flag which
if set to 0 indicates no witness.
Majority transactions, based on the data provided by block explorers, happen
between two peers resulting in 1 input and 2 outputs along with 2 witnesses therefore
resulting in an almost static transaction size. This results in a linear throughput
increase with the increase in block size.
Public blockchains, seeing this limitation on throughput, have been slowly forking
over to larger block sizes. Dash currently has a 2MB block size limit within a 2.5
4
minute block interval. Bitcoin Cash over the years has slowly forked the blockchain
multiple times to increase the block limit to 32MB. [4] lists all forks that happened
with bitcoin.
1.1.2 Challenge: Validation of large blocks
As block size gets bigger, validation of individual transactions ( a 1GB block may
have over a million transactions ), 2 million taking average transaction size to be 500
bytes, becomes a challenge for personal computers or Raspberry Pis that are running
full nodes on the network. One of the key reasons for this challenge is that although
all clients employ infrastructure with multiple threads, the blockchain code does not
make use of threads at its full potential. Recent research at Stanford [35] shows that
even though a gigabyte block may be propagated in the block interval constraint, it
will be hard to validate the number of transactions. This resulted in the changing the
implementation of Bitcoin Cash cryptocurrency to handle a large number of threads
in order to increase the performance of the software.
1.1.3 Challenge: Relay of large blocks
Block relay (1.1) on the blockchain network uses a gossip protocol in which a node
relays the newly heard blocks to its peers which is approximately in the neighbourhood
of 8-10 peers. This information is relayed using a series of messages. On hearing about
a new block, the first node validates the complete block and then advertises the block
its peers using an inv(Inventory message, which is a 64 byte hash of the received
block). If the peer on the other side hasn’t heard of this 64 byte hash, it sends a
getdata message ( 36 bytes ) to the first peer. In response to the getdata message,
the second peer now transmits the whole block to the first peer. This is the size of a
full block (current block size agreed upon by the network).
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Figure 1.1: Traditional Relay
As the block size increases on the network, the last message (getdata) relay is
bound on the upstream bandwidth of the second peer, therefore slowing down the
propagation of blocks through the network.
Miners on the network although receive a transaction fee on adding a transaction
to the block, a major portion of their revenue come from the block reward. If the
miners are not able to propagate their blocks to the network, they lose the block
reward and with that their potential profits. The block that was mined correctly but
was still not added to the blockchain is referred to as an orphan block. This leads
the miners to either mine smaller blocks (less revenue because of less transactions)
or not mine at all. The former leads to a lower throughput and the latter leads to
risks of Centralization since only a handful a miners can afford to relay larger blocks
because of high bandwidth requirements.
1.2 Existing Solutions
In the recent years, the solutions to speed up propagation process have aimed at
reducing the payload of the block. In the gossip protocol, transactions are relayed in
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the network using the same process as of blocks. Every transaction that happens on a
node, is broadcasted to all its peers using an inventory message(inv) that is followed
by a getdata and a transaction data transmission, if required. Since this data has
already been transferred across the network, there was an opportunity to send only
the information required to propagate the block. That involves a metadata of all
the transactions and the full transactions that have not already been transmitted
to the requesting peer. This led to developing three different solutions that manage
to send a significantly smaller payload in the block, while also being able to relay
the complete block. Although these existing solutions are efficient in relaying the
metadata, work in a probabilistic way because of the assumption that a majority of
the full transaction information is synchronized in the network.
Transaction data that has not yet been included in the network, is kept in the
memory of the node and referred to as memory pool . Since these are the data that
the miners use to create new blocks, synchronization of memory pool is important
if we are relaying metadata for block reconstruction. However, new research in [14],
discussed in details in Chapter 3 (Design and Methodology), states that, that is not
always the case.
The motivation and protocol for solutions that work on decreasing the block pay-
load are explained below in section X.
1.2.1 Compact Blocks
Bitcoin Improvement Protocol (BIP) 152 [19] introduces Compact blocks as a
payload reduction technique. Compact blocks are based on the idea that most trans-
actions on the network are already transmitted to the peers and only the difference
in the information is to be sent across for efficient relay.
The process to relay a compact block is shown in 1.3 for high bandwidth relay
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Figure 1.2: Low Bandwidth Compact Relay
Figure 1.3: High Bandwidth Compact Relay
and 1.2 for low bandwidth compact relay and is explained below:
1. All nodes that support compact blocks broadcast Sendcmpct(0) or Sendcmpct(1)
for non-expedited or expedited relay respectively.
2. A new blocks is mined, the header or inv is sent to the receiving node.
3. If the receiver node hasn’t yet received the block, it sends a getdata(cmpct)
request to the Sender node.
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4. The sender node responds with a compact block, which is collection of 6 byte
shortids of transactions and some pre-filled transactions that the node might
not have heard of. (Example the coinbase transaction)
5. In case of collision of the shortid or the receiver not having the transaction
information, the peer requests all the transactions (it doesn’t have) in the form
of getblocktxn request.
6. The above request is responded with a blocktxn message that contains the full
transactions.
Based on the above process, one can understand that the compact block saves
significant bandwidth by reducing the block payload to relay metadata information
across the network. [2] states that the maximum sketch for a block is seen to be
between 9 and 20KBs for 1MB block, and has a 90% chance of block propagation
happening without having to re-request the extra transmissions. The protocol doc-
umentation does not provide any information on how it affects when the block size
increases or how this technique will scale with an increased flow in transactions. There
are several weaknesses that were observed after the protocol went live through a soft
fork [11]:
1. The memory pools of different nodes in a high transaction flow environment
are not synchronized. The node allocates a certain amount of memory to its
memory pool, and after this memory pool fills up, the transactions that arrive
later are dropped
1.2.2 Xtreme Thin Block
Bitcoin Unlimited Improvement Protocol (BUIP010) [1] proposed and imple-
mented another form of payload reduction called Extreme Thin Blocks XThin. This
9
Figure 1.4: XThin Relay
technique uses a similar technique as Compact block. It does add more complications
explained below in order to decrease the re-transmission rate. The process to relay
an XThin block is shown in 1.4 and is explained below:
1. All nodes that support XThin Blocks, run another service NODE XTHIN as a way
of letting the network know the kind of blocks they support.
2. The receiver node creates a bloom filter of all the items in its memory pool. It
then requests the block getdata along with the bloom filter.
3. The Sender then sends the block adding all transaction IDs(8 bytes) also referred
as cheap hashes along with header information and full transactions that the
receiver doesn’t have (based on the receiver’s memory pool).
4. The receiver reconstructs the block using the transactions that it has in its
memory pool along with the full transactions supplied by the Sender.
The protocol documentation states that the block sizes reduce to a maximum
block sketch of 17.5 KB in the experiments that were run on 1MB blocks. This was
observed when the protocol went live with Bitcoin-Bitcoin Cash hard fork as well.
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Figure 1.5: Graphene Relay
Xtreme Thin blocks face several problems as well:
1. Bloom filters although encode information in a relatively much smaller size, but
have a False Positive Rate associated with it. In case of of false positives, the
full transactions are re-requested by the receiver node.
1.2.3 Graphene blocks
Bitcoin Unlimited Improvement Protocol (BUIP093) [13] proposes Graphene Re-
lay propagation in order to further decrease the payload of a block. The Graphene
propagation however gets rid of the shortID list implementation and sends a bloom
filter along with an Invertible Bloom Lookup table [24] in order to relay information.
The graphene protocol is shown in 1.5 and is explained below:
1. The sender sends an inv:inventory message to notify an new block.
2. The receiver requests the graphene block using getgrblk message along with
the count of transactions in its mempool.
3. The sender sends the graphene payload that consists of a bloom filter of all the
transactions inside the block and an Invertible Bloom Lookup Table.
11
4. The Invertible Bloom Lookup Table consists of a mapping of all transaction IDs
along with the cheap hashes (the first 8 bytes of the Transaction ID).
5. Ranks of transaction IDs are calculated using lexicographical ordering.
6. The receiver on the other hand collects all transaction IDs in its memory pool
and orphan pool and filters the transactions of the block using the Sender’s
bloom filter.
7. Using these filtered transactions an IBLT is constructed at the receiver’s end
and subtracts the sender IBLT from it.
8. IBLT decode success is based on either the subtraction to lead an empty set or
a non-empty set in which the remaining transactions can be requested again.
9. IBLT decode failure can happen based on its probabilistic nature or when the
receiver IBLT has very low transactions to match or a checksum failure.
The above mentioned technique is highly efficient for sending large blocks when
memory pools are synced. In case of IBLT decode failures results in the node request-
ing a full block in order to avoid a Denial of Service attack.
1.3 Current Proposal
The techniques, mentioned in Section 1.2,
1. rely on memory synchronization of nodes communicating the blocks and the
overhead of decode failures is re-transmission of full data back from the sender.
2. They also rely on a single peer to send the complete data as opposed to using
multiple peers to transmit partial data.
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3. They can only be used to receive blocks that are currently being propagated.
They can’t be used to sync new nodes.
1.3.1 Digital Fountain
This thesis aims to leverage the research of digital fountains [16] [26] [38] [39]
in order to propagate block information as a fallback method for the above existing
solutions.
In order to make these methods more efficient, this thesis aims to add a protocol
of aggregating data taken from multiple peer nodes in the form of encoded symbols,
collecting them over to the receiver end and re-constructing the block.
In case of block failure, in the current blockchains, the peer requests all the full
transactions from one peer using getdata. In case of large blocks, this is a time
consuming relay and can lead to higher orphan rates and hurt the profitability of
miners. As an alternative, the receiving node can request all the peer nodes for part
of data and reconstruct the block and recreate the source block. This significantly
reduces the uploads per peer in the network and reduces the stress of data transmission
per node. However, the overall data downloaded by the receiving peer has some
overhead in case of decode failures.
There are 2 ways of implementing this idea:
1. Creating a list of transactions that are missing and dividing them among all
nodes and requesting for the specific data.
2. Requesting a Forward Error Correcting fountain code, that if the receiver has
enough symbols of, can recreate the block. This method is explained and is
worked out in this thesis.
The reasons for using the latter technique are the following:
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1. The fountain code symbols can be transmitted over both UDP and TCP. While
transmitting this data in a UDP network, there will be a need to transmit
additional overhead symbols in case of data loss.
2. In a blockchain network, when in the above described techniques if a decode
failure happens, the whole block data needs to be sent. However, when using
fountain codes, the whole data need not be sent . It is sufficient to send more
repair symbols to successfully decode. These symbols are smaller in size and,
thus, get transmitted faster.
3. Miners with higher bandwidth can use asynchronous multicast to reliably trans-
mit data.
Trade offs of using the fountain code technique are as follows:
1. Extra computation is added to a node in order to create the symbols before
relaying them. These computations are only done once, by the miner while
relaying the symbol. The other nodes can flush the symbols to disk and use it
for relaying at anytime.
2. There is overhead while reconstructing the block. In order to decrease the
number of decode failures, overhead repair symbols are added. However, this
burden is added on the download side and not on upload side, because the
upload is shared by a set of peers.
14
Chapter 2
RELATED WORK AND THEORY
This thesis is inspired from the delivery methods utilized by Content delivery Net-
works (CDNs) [31] [34] [41] [42] and torrent networks in order to relay large files on
a network in an efficient manner. CDNs transmit large file over an adaptive relay
network in the form of software or media distribution. In order to transmit these
large files to multiple thousands of clients, the CDN caches symbols in its memory
and opens up many fountains one for each client.[32] and [33] show efficient ways of
using fountain codes to deliver a continuous stream of systematic symbols (System-
atic symbols : The first k that are transmitted are the encoded data part). Assuming
that a part of those k symbols are dropped, repair symbols are sent till the client
collects a total of k ( original + repair) symbols and is able to reconstruct this data.
Torrents on the other hand use a distributed file in order to find the nodes that
can provide the information. This file is called the torrent file. When we know the
nodes that can provide the information, we request them for the information. These
nodes respond with a part of the file that they own. When all nodes provide the
known information, the file is aggregated and reconstructed into the usable file.
BitTorrents [5] [18] were experimented to use fountain codes in 2012 by [20].
However, the results in the case of torrents were almost comparable to the one with
no coding technique used in the initial phase, but as enough seeders seed the data,
the download with coding increases to a much faster rate. In our case, the block will
be present with all the seeders, therefore the algorithm to find/disperse data is not
employed as is the case with this paper.
In the context of blockchains, miners who need to send the information to many
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nodes and in a fast and reliable manner, stream multiple fountains for each node that
they are connected to. The full nodes use the torrent approach of aggregating data
and upload the partial information.
Blockchains, in the near future, in order to scale on chain will require to transmit
large blocks over the network in a relatively small block interval. Since, CDNs effec-
tively transmits their target data for efficient downloads, the idea can be abstracted
and specific pieces of technology can be utilized in blockchains to synchronize large
blocks over the decentralized distributed network.
2.1 Digital Fountains Codes
The common analogy to understand Fountain codes, is a water fountain. In order
to fill a glass of water, one needs enough water, and not specific parts of water.
Fountain codes work on the same principle. In order to reconstruct data, one needs
enough symbols, here k. They can be a combination of source and repair symbols.
Fountain codes are also known as rateless erasure codes. Near optimal erasure
codes [29] can transform k symbol messages into practically infinitely encoded form
i.e. they can generate an arbitrary amount of redundancy symbols that can be used for
error correction. Luby Transform [27] codes are the first class of practical fountain
codes which depend on bipartite graphs to trade reception overhead for encoding and
decoding speed.
These codes employ a simple ⊕ based algorithm to encode and decode a message.
And these codes adopt only a one way communication protocol which can directly be
plugged as an alternative to getdata request explained in the coming chapters.
2.1.1 Encoding and Decoding of Luby Transform Codes
1. The sender encodes and sends packets of information.
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2. The receiver evaluates each packet. If the packet has an error, it discards that
packet, otherwise it is saved as a message.
3. Eventually the receiver has enough valid packets to reconstruct the message, on
which an ACK is sent after transmission.
Luby Transform Encoding Process
1. The message is divided into n blocks of roughly equal length.
2. The degree d, 1 <= d <= n is chosen at random.
3. d blocks are chosen at random.
4. If Mi is the i
th block of the message, data portion of the next packet is Mi1⊕
Mi2⊕ ...⊕Mid
5. A prefix is appended to the encoded packet: defining n, d and a list of indices
i1, i2, ..id.
6. Some form of error detecting code (as simple as cyclic redundancy check) is
applied to the packet and transmitted.
Luby Transform Decoding Process
1. The packet is first checked, if the packet isn’t clean or it has already been sent,
it is discarded.
2. If the cleanly received packet is of degree d > 1, it is first processed against all
the fully decoded blocks in the message queuing area, then stored in a buffer
area if its reduced degree is greater than 1.
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3. If d = 1 is received, the packet is matched against all the packets of d > 1
residing in the buffer. If d = 2 is received, it is reduced to d = 1 and moved to
message queuing area.
4. When all the n blocks are produced, the signal is transmitted.
2.1.2 Raptor Codes
Raptor codes are systematic fountain codes, where on receiving symbols the sys-
tem can’t identify whether these are original source or the repair symbols.
The way these are generated is, from the original source k symbols are constructed
that can decode the entire source. Once we know that, the k can decode the original,
we generate more symbols from the original symbols again and call them the repair
symbols. The receiver end now gets a degree distribution in such a way that we don’t
actually require symbols of degree 1 to decode all the original symbols.The degree
distribution employed for RaptorQ is taken from a mix of 2 or more distributions.
Any mix of source and repair symbols, as long as we have enough symbols (k), we
can decode the source.
The idea that makes Raptor codes work they do, is deactivation decoding. In
order to decode the entire data, we find a very small fraction of symbols through Giant
Component analysis and which can be later discovered using Gaussian elimination as
shown in [36] and [28], that if we assume to be decoded, we can decode the rest of
the data.
With this version improvised over time, if k symbols are received at the receiver’s
end, there is a .5% chance of failure and is independent of k, and with every overhead
symbol, the chances of failure to decode reduces by a factor of 200 as stated in [37].
Therefore, for the current time, the research on erasure channels have reached
to optimality with the invention of raptorQ codes with a clever use of two or more
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degree distributions.
The result on Raptor codes shows that a file on TCP that takes about 2min 15
seconds to downloads, downloads in about 13 seconds. Therefore, this research is
further applied to recover/reconstruct data in blockchain in order to understand its
implications on block propagation.
Some of the advantages of these codes, as stated in the paper [15]
1. Scalable: The server (miner) load remains constant if the number of leeching
nodes increase. In cases of miners relaying blocks on asynchronous multicast
connections, this will help increase the performance in sending data.
2. Reliable: An exact copy of the original file is reconstructed at the receiver end,
which is very important, since we are dealing with transactional data.
3. Reception Efficient: The total number of packets that each receiver needs
to reconstruct the file or data is minimal. In ideal cases, the length of data to
be received equals the length of aggregated symbols. As we add more symbols,
every symbols decreases the chance of decode failure by 200.
4. Time Efficient:The time spent to generate and reconstruct the packets is
minimal. These symbols can be saved in a file and can be directly broadcasted
in order to respond to a request.
5. Time Independent: Receivers may initiate the download at their discretion,
implying that different receivers may start the download at widely disparate
times. Receivers may sporadically be interrupted and continue the download at
a later time.
6. Server Independent: Receivers may collect packets for the file from one or
more servers that are transmitting packets. No coordination between servers
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should be required for this.
7. Tolerant: The protocol should tolerate a heterogeneous population of receivers,
especially a variety of end-to-end packet loss rates and data rates.
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Chapter 3
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 The Simulator
In order to understand propagation and the scalability of the dash network, a sim-
ulator was developed at ASU using an already existing simulator that was developed
at ETH Zurich for this research [23]
The ETH blockchain simulator is an NS3 (Network Simulator 3) based bitcoin sim-
ulator. This simulator demonstrates the workings of Bitcoin, Dogecoin and Litecoin,
but bases its research on each block being the fundamental/rudimentary component.
We found that simulations that merely went down to the block level were not
detailed enough for our purpose. In order to reliably model a consensus network
with block propagation speedups such as compact or xthin we must understand these
networks down at the level of transactions.
In order to understand the network at the level of transactions, we modeled gen-
eration of transactions using a normal distribution. Each node is has a transaction
generator that creates a random transaction with a piecewise constant distribution
and hashes that data.
Masternode in the current simulator is not a separate class but a check on full
node. The network is randomly distributed with full nodes, masternodes and the
miners. All the miners in the network are connected to each other which simulates
the real world network. When establishing the connections between nodes, we create
point-to-point channels between them, which abstracts away any intermediate devices
(routes, switches, etc). These channels have two characteristics:
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1. Latency
2. Bandwidth
Mining pools typically maintain private peering connections among themselves
which we capture in our simulations.
In short, below are the modifications done to the bitcoin-simulator for it to run
the current dash-simulations:
1. Transactions are added in order to add traffic and understand propagation tech-
niques in more detail.
2. Every node now has its own mempool in order to test set reconciliation for
Xthin and Compact propagation.
3. Compact block propagation is added.
4. Extreme thin block propagation is added.
5. Masternode (bool) is added to the full-node. Because this is network propaga-
tion, the bandwidth is the only differentiating factor between a full node and
masternode.
6. Bloom filter using Murmur Hash library is added in order to test xthin.
7. Capability to test x-11 hashing is added, although it doesn’t add value to prop-
agation.
8. FillBlock - this parameter if true, fills the block with transactions to its max-
imum capacity. If this is set to false, the simulator uses a piecewise constant
distribution to generate the next block size and adds transactions limiting to
the new block size.
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The resulting simulator code is available at [17]
3.1.1 Parameters
The simulator takes in the below given parameters:
1. Block size
2. Block Interval
3. Propagation type
4. Number of blocks
5. Fill block - The block is filled to capacity if fillBlock=true.
We ran multiple experiments in order to understand and compare the below three
types of propagation:
1. Traditional
2. Compact
3. Extreme Thin Blocks
The simulations were run with different network sizes and different block sizes.
Through these simulations, it was realized that both compact and xthin blocks can
support the Dash network with a capacity an order of magnitude larger than the
traditional block propagation.
We ran simulations for both Compact and XThin in the same testing set up from
block sizes of 1 MB to 10MB. Through the experiments, we were able to observe
that compact blocks are not scalable above 4MB block sizes on the dash network.
However, we were able to propagate XThin blocks with lower orphan rates. The
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reason XThin blocks gave us better results is because of the bloom filter that is sent
apart from cheap hashes, which helps understand the other peer whether or not what
full transactions to send.
Note: The simulator does not always present the same results every time because
the propagation can take different routes, the distributions used can use different node
bandwidths, blocks are generated using Geometric progression from a seed value which
is generated from a random seed. Parameters and distributions used in the simulator,
gives some variance to the results, although the increase/decrease slope of the results
can be confidently used.
3.2 Hypothesis
The memory pools of the nodes on the network are not synchronized when there
is high amount of transaction flow. This is because of the following reasons:
1. Unspent transactions that are relayed to the node are stored in-memory. When
transactions flow is high, and the memory is full, the transactions are dropped.
2. Transactions use gossip protocol for propagation through the decentralized net-
work and therefore rely on nodes that are forwarding it. It is not always possible
for the transaction to have relayed to a node where the block is received. Since,
compact, XThin and graphene rely on memory pool synchronization, it is not
always the case that all transactions relayed in the block sketch are known to
the node.
Since, the memory pools of the peers go out of sync, reducing payload by using
cheap hashes often leads to re-transmissions. This re-transmission is in the form of
complete block or block transactions. In order to increase the speed of this request,
we use fountain codes. Using fountain codes enables reliable transmission of data
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between all peer nodes and then aggregating the data at the node that is requesting
the block.
The reasons of using and applying them to blockchains for transmitting data are
multifold:
1. The primary reason for using fountain (raptor) codes is that they work on
quantity (k) of symbols rather than quality (what part of data is being relayed).
Therefore, on receiving any k symbols, we can reconstruct a block with 99.5%
efficiency [37] .
2. Infinite decoding symbols can be created using the data, all peers required
to send the data create k/(number of peers) symbols, independent of what
the other peers have created, and then send them to the receiving node to
reconstruct the block.
3. On decode failures, creating more decode or repair symbols has a linear com-
plexity therefore these symbols are not compute heavy.
4. The repair symbols are small in size and can be relayed faster rather than
sending the whole block for recovery.
The most important among others for us is that they are computationally easier
to encode/decode since they use binary operations for both and they are server in-
dependent. In case of blockchains, we can ask data from all connected peer nodes
and collect symbols to recreate the block. This will generate a lower upload footprint
for the nodes that are serving data therefore leads to a faster synchronization. The
scalability can be tested by using this propagation technique for large block sizes
till we lose consensus (Orphan rate = 50%). The block propagation throughput is
constrained by orphan rate of the network.
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3.3 The protocol specifications
Below are the specifications of the implementation of protocol used by digital
fountain in blockchains:
1. The sender node, on hearing a new block, sends an inv to another peer. The
whole block body is reinterpreted as a byte array and then encoded into a set
of symbols of a length that was negotiated between the peers.
2. On receiving the inv/header message the receiver requests the whole blocks
using an expedited getraptor request to all its peers.
3. All peers who have heard of the block respond with raptorcode and encoded
symbols of the blocks. The other peers drop the message.
4. The receiver collects these symbols in a singleton class (map of block header
ID to symbol ID and symbol pair). Note that, since this research is done for
large block sizes, symbols here will be significantly large. In order to prevent
DoS attacks, every symbol must contain the header. The header should not be
encoded. In smaller blocks, this can be optimized to send only the 64 byte hash
along with every symbol.
5. The receiver knows the amount of symbols needed to reconstruct the block and
waits till it gets at least the required count of the symbols.
6. On reaching the required count, it reconstructs the block using raptor decoding
and serializes the stream on byte array to form the block.
The above is also shown in the figure 3.1
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Figure 3.1: Protocol
3.4 Implementation Details
The implementation in order to test the hypothesis of data aggregation is done in
2 parts:
1. Dash Core Client:In this specific implementation, the following parts are
implemented:
(a) RaptorQ (RFC6330) encoder and decoder: This is done in c++
adhering to the Dashcore standards. The header-only C++ version of
libRaptorQ is used. This is implemented in order to under to understand
the encoding and decoding procedure for each custom data type (block,
transaction, etc). Also, to collect data on number of symbols and symbol
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sizes in order to re-create the data.
(b) Signaling: Signals are developed in the dash client. This is primarily done
to understand the use cases where a node can be automatically attacked
without a malicious intention. ( example: in an expedited raptorcode
message from a non-miner node can be considered as DoS, because symbols
will get recovered after we receive all symbols)
Modifications in the dash client:
(a) New classes for Raptor Symbol and Raptor Symbol data has been added.
The raptor symbol class creates a vector of symbols to be sent in as the
message, while the data class captures the size of each symbol, the total
size, the time taken to encode and decode the data.
(b) A new singleton class is added that keeps track of all symbol data mapped
to its header that a node contains. This data remains in memory for the
last 6 blocks and is then flushed to disk.
(c) A symbol decoder is developed that collects the symbols in the singleton
class and keeps a check on the count. It tries to decode only when the
symbols are collected.
2. Dash Simulator: Dash client gives us a good transparency of how encoding
and decoding will work, and the symbol sizes, and the constraints. However, in
order to test how scalable the hypothesis is, experiments need to be run with
variable block sizes, variable symbol sizes and number of connections. While
testing in the Dash client, the regression test mode needs to be used but it
does not add any latency between the nodes which defeats the purpose of the
propagation. The testnet can be used, but large block sizes can not be tested
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because of the low transaction flow on the testnet. Dash Simulator that has
been described above, gives the following advantages:
(a) It helps in understanding the metrics of every node, which is not available
in public blockchains. Also, it will be not be available because of security
reasons.
(b) It helps us run various parameters and help model the blockchain in a way
we want it to be tested.
Modifications in the Simulator:
(a) Since the testing of propagation of blocks is to bested, for this hypothesis
transaction and memory pool have been removed.
(b) The masternode layer is still there.
(c) 2 new messages have been introduced, getraptor and raptorcode.
(d) The getraptorcode is sent to all peers as soon as one hears about the
block through the inv/header message.
(e) The raptorcodes are uploaded in a stream of messages.
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Chapter 4
EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
The current raptor code in Dash is only developed for replacing getdata requests.
We have compared 2 metrics in order to compare the techniques. The results shown
below can efficiently be applied to compact blocks, XThin and Graphene blocks in
cases where the block transactions are sent.
4.1 Evaluation Criteria
1. The orphan rate. The orphan rate tells us how many blocks weren’t added to
the block and how much profitable it will be for a miner to use this technique.
2. The block propagation times for median block propagation on of the nodes.
The block sizes we have used are from 100MB to 1GB.
3. Orphan rates for different symbol sizes help us understand what symbol size to
use.
Below is a detail of all the experiments that were run in order to test the hypothesis
and understand the implications of introducing Fountain Codes into the current state
of blockchains.
4.2 Dash Core Client
4.2.1 Testing Environment
1. DashCore version 12.3 is used for development.
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2. libRaptorQ [22] 0.1.X branch, 697b318036a1ea4751e69cde7989ff3b3bd7c655 com-
mit is used. The code needs to be changed in order to directly include the header
files.
3. 3 local nodes in regression test mode were spawned for each experiment.
4. Each node creates its own blockchain in the assigned directory.
The tests done on the actual dash core client were used to find out how many
repair symbols were used in order to complete the data.
4.2.2 Observations
1. It was observed, that for a block on regression test mode, the aggregated size
of k encoded symbols had the same size as that of a block mined.
2. In the setup of 3 nodes and 4 nodes, we sent 1/3 and 1/4 encoded symbols from
each node to the receiving node and we were able to recreate the block.
3. For small block sizes, we used 4 byte and 16 byte symbols. But for larger
blocks, symbols can be as long as we want, with the constraint that symbol
size is divisible by encoded array sent. If this is not the case, the decode fails.
Therefore, symbol size and encoded vector size is negotiated in the getraptor
request.
4.3 Dash Simulator
4.3.1 Testing Environment
1. The simulator is run with 24 nodes, with 8 mining pools. 8 full nodes and 8
masternodes. 24 nodes here represent the whole network because:
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(a) For this protocol to work, memory pool synchronization is not required.
(b) Both traditional and the fountain protocol are compared on a 24 node
network in order to have a fair comparison.
(c) Traditional propagation is used, because the messages - blocktxn, xblocktx
and grblocktx in compact, XThin and graphene respectively are similar to
full blocks except they are smaller in size (Since only missing transactions
are propagated.
2. The masternodes although in the real network have higher bandwidth, in this
experiment we have kept it the same as full nodes. The reason for this is to
extrapolate these results to other public cryptocurrencies.
3. The average bandwidth taken for each node is taken from [12], where the paper
talks about the latency and the bandwidth distribution for each continent.
4. The simulations for run for 100 blocks each.
5. Different symbol sizes have been used to understand the dependency of symbol
sizes on orphan rate. k varies between 10 and 10000 i.e the number of symbols
required to reconstruct the block. Orphan rates are calculated for each of these
k to understand the ideal size for raptor code symbol size.
6. Each node only forwards 50% symbols, except the miners, who stream the all
the symbols. In case if only one node is streaming the block, the data is re-
requested and the rest 50% are streamed.
7. The average bandwidth distributions are taken from [12] which for these simu-
lations ranged below 50 MB per second.
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Figure 4.1: Orphan rate with respect to symbol Sizes
Choosing the symbol size
In order to aggregate the symbols from the peer nodes, we need to understand what
ratio of the block size should the symbol size be in order for the propagation to be
optimal for the bandwidth of the nodes that we have tested.
The following are the observations based on 4.1. In the graph, k refers to the
number of symbols required to reconstruct the block. All symbols are equal in size.
1. For k = 10, we see that for 100MB blocks although the orphan rate starts with
a low value of 9%, it increases fast as the block size increases. This is because
the symbols sizes become larger than the upload bandwidth for the node and
therefore take time to propagate.
2. For k = 100 and k = 1000 , the orphan rate increases at almost the same rate.
It can be noticed that although the symbol sizes differ by a magnitude of 10,
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Figure 4.2: Block Size vs Orphan Rate k=10
for block sizes between 100MB and 1000MB, symbols will vary between 1MB
and 10MB, which are still not utilizing the complete bandwidth of the node and
hence take lesser time to propagate and therefore less orphanage.
3. For k = 10000 in smaller block sizes, between 100MB and 400MB, the perfor-
mance is optimal, although when the block sizes grow, it is seen that the orphan
rate is similar to that of k = 100 and k = 1000, which is still significantly less
than the original block propagation.
4.3.2 Results
Orphan Rates
From graphs 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 we can observe,
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Figure 4.3: Block Size vs Orphan Rate k=100
1. The orphan rate in traditional relay reaches close to 97%, that is that almost all
blocks produced get orphaned when we run a 1 GigaByte simulation. That said,
for all block sizes between 100MB and 1GB, the network is unable to maintain
consensus.
2. On the contrary, we see that when the data is aggregated from multiple peers,
the orphan rate is contained below 50% for a 400MB block with k = 10 and for
k between 100 and 10000, the network maintains consensus below 600MB.
Bandwidth
1. average bandwidth Average bandwidth used by both cases is similar in our
simulations, however we are sending no overhead symbols. In case of lesser than
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Figure 4.4: Block Size vs Orphan Rate k=1000
k symbols received, we ask the peers again to send more symbols.
2. The total number of getraptor are significantly higher, by a factor of 2, in
some cases 3. That is because of us sending multiple requests to aggregate one
block. This doesn’t affect the overall bandwidth utilization because the size of
the request is 36 bytes each.
Median Block Propagation
From graphs 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, we can observe,
1. The median block propagation for block sizes in traditional block propagation
elevate above 2.5 minutes in 200MB block sizes, and that is noticeable in 4.2
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Figure 4.5: Block Size vs Orphan Rate k=10000
that 200MB blocks are not in consensus.
2. The median block propagation remains below 2.5 minutes for Raptor Code
Propagation till 400MB for k=10 and remain below below 2.5 minutes for 600MB
blocks for k between 100 and 10000. Therefore 4.2 shows that consensus is
maintained till 400MB blocks for k=10 and 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show consensus is
maintained for 600MB blocks for k values between 100 and 10000.
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Figure 4.6: Median Block propagation k=10
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Figure 4.7: Median Block propagation k=100
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Figure 4.8: Median Block propagation k=1000
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Figure 4.9: Median Block propagation k=10000
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
Analyzing the above results, we can conclude that utilizing data aggregation tech-
niques on a node for data propagation works better than syncing block using one
peer. It must be noted that full nodes are personal machines that do not have high
bandwidth. They get several advantages when only relaying symbols instead of the
full blocks:
1. Miners have the capability of multi-casting. In the experiments, we have used
TCP connections, but we have scheduled these uploads simultaneously. They
can simultaneously serve large blocks to many nodes by continuous asynchronous
streams, which wasn’t possible in the traditional relay.
2. The data received by a full node is downloaded through multiple peers in parallel
which results in faster downloads.
The above advantages, help nodes to propagate large blocks faster. Although, The
current propagation techniques result in much faster propagation and lower orphan
rates. Those (compact, XThin, Graphene) techniques have been tested on smaller
blocks and they are highly dependent on memory pool synchronization. If memory
pools (of the peers propagating blocks) do not synchronize, the methods fail to relay
blocks faster and rely back on the traditional propagation. This thesis is intended
to put the idea that today’s state of art of propagation techniques (compact, XThin
and Graphene) can take advantage of fountain codes for relay as a complimentary
technology to make propagation faster.
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5.1 Future Work
We have seen from the above experiments that the orphan rate is significantly
reduced when sending the Fountain codes instead of leeching the block from a sin-
gle client. The orphan rate for a 100 MB blocks reduces from 17% to 9% which is
very profitable for a miner. We can also conclude that the network is able to main-
tain consensus upto 600MB blocks as compared to 100MB in traditional. We also
know that orphan rates is much lower and transmission speed is higher in techniques
like Compact blocks, XThin blocks and graphene blocks because they efficiently re-
duce the payload while sending the draft/sketch of the whole block. The one major
area where fountain codes can make these techniques better is when there is a need
for re-transmission of block data (blocktxn ,xblocktx and grblocktx which block
transactions for compact block, xthin blocks and graphene blocks respectively).
In order to show the advantage of using fountain codes in increasing the perfor-
mance of compact, XThin and Graphene blocks, the protocol will be more complicated
because memory pool of each nodes are being used for encoding and decoding.
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